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Abstract 
 Incidental emotion can powerfully impact risky decision-making 
processes, yet the specific mechanisms that drive this relationship require further 
exploration. The appraisal theory of emotion suggests that emotional valence 
alone cannot accurately predict an emotion’s effect on risk-taking. Rather, 
specific appraisal dimensions of an emotional experience—particularly the 
perception of control—have been found to critically influence risk-taking across 
settings. Previous literature indicates that guilt, a negative emotion characterized 
by high personal control, led to higher risk preferences. The current study sought 
to replicate these findings and test whether a similar relationship would be found 
for the positive emotion of pride. Data was collected from 152 participants who 
were randomly assigned to pride induction, guilt induction, sadness induction, or 
a neutral control condition. Risky decision-making was assessed using a gambling 
task where participants were asked to choose either between guaranteed or risky 
financial outcomes. It was hypothesized that both pride and guilt would lead to 
higher risk-taking and that this relationship would be mediated by higher 
perceptions of personal control; however, no significant differences in risk-taking 
based on emotion condition were found. Study results confirmed unique appraisal 
patterns for pride, guilt, and sadness, however, and suggest that other people may 
have more agency in experiences of pride than previously assumed. Implications 
for future research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 Imagine two men who have sat down at a table of roulette to enjoy an 
evening of gambling and possible good fortune. Both have just come from a long 
day at work and are ready to try their luck at a game of chance. The first is in a 
buoyant mood, having been unexpectedly promoted earlier that day. The second 
has just been fired. Knowing these facts, are we accurately able to predict whether 
one person is more or less likely to place high, risky bets than the other? Will the 
events of the day influence the men’s current behavior and, if so, how? Although 
the answers to these questions remain complex, researchers agree that emotions 
are often crucial to comprehending behavior. Even transient emotional 
experiences—such as the joy elicited from a promotion or the anger of being laid 
off—can impact the complex cognitions of decision making (Lerner, Li, 
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). Although incidental emotion may involve even 
affect that operates outside of an individual’s conscious awareness, it interacts 
powerfully with integral emotion to guide judgments and alter behavior (Han, 
Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Västfjäl et al., 2016). The current research investigated 
more specifically whether incidental emotions rooted in perceptions of personal 
control increase risky decision-making via emotional appraisals. 
Emotion and Risk 
 Valence-based models. Affective experience exerts powerful influence 
over information processing and is used as a tool to inform judgments (Schwarz 
& Clore, 1981). The importance of emotion in decision-making increases when a 
person believes their feelings are relevant to the current situation or when 
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processing becomes more difficult due to distraction or cognitive load. The effect 
is strengthened further when a person possesses a high level of trust in his or her 
own feelings (Avnet, Pham, & Stephen, 2012). Traditionally, valence-based 
models have prioritized the differences in an emotion’s degree of pleasantness as 
the most critical dimension when comparing the influence of emotions on 
decision-making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Consequently, it is assumed that the 
effects of all positive emotions (e.g., joy, gratitude, and hope) should be relatively 
similar to one another and significantly different from the effects of negative 
emotions (e.g., anger, fear, and disgust).  
Nevertheless, emotional valence alone cannot predict a single, consistent 
behavioral outcome across contexts (Andrade & Cohen, 2007).  Although people 
in positive moods regularly predict greater positive outcomes from risky scenarios 
and perceive less risk in the environment overall (and people in negative moods 
consistently predict the opposite), this risk perception does not necessarily parallel 
actual risk-taking behavior (Andrade & Cohen, 2007). It would be expected that 
people who perceive fewer risks would engage in more risky choices, yet this has 
not consistently been found as an effect of positive emotion. Competing theories 
have been proposed as explanation. People experiencing negative affect may be 
more drawn to risks, for example, because of the potential reward’s mood-
enhancing potential—or, they may be more averse to the consequences because 
their negative emotional state highlights potential loss. Similarly, positive affect 
may at times lead individuals to feel overconfident in risky scenarios, but when 
the stakes rise and the potential consequences become more salient, some studies 
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show that these individuals become more risk-averse than their negative-affect 
counterparts (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Andrade & Cohen, 2007).   
Contrary to one proposed explanation, Isen et al. (1988) did not find 
evidence that the valence of an emotional experience enhanced the desirability of 
possible rewards in risk-taking scenarios; perceived rewards were rated as equally 
appealing by happy people, unhappy people, and the control group. However, 
emotion induction did influence perceptions of consequences—those who were 
happier perceived potential loss as more severe (i.e., people were protective of 
their current positive affect). Isen et al.’s (1988) findings demonstrated that the 
influence of incidental emotion on behavioral outcomes is context-dependent and 
cannot be generalized based on valence alone; therefore, alternative models are 
necessary. The appraisal theory of emotion offers a more utilitarian framework to 
investigate when and why specific emotions impact judgments and decision-
making (Lerner et al., 2015). 
Appraisal theory of emotion. The appraisal theory of emotion 
distinguishes between discrete affective experiences by viewing emotional 
processes as “adaptive responses which reflect appraisals of features of the 
environment” (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013, p. 119). Although 
valence is incorporated into this model, it is not the only significant factor. 
Emotions are based on a perception of the person-environment relationship and 
are elicited by a unique combination of characteristics that are most commonly 
defined along multiple dimensions, including pleasantness, agency, level of 
certainty, attentional activity, anticipated effort, novelty, and personal control 
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(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Moors et al., 2013). Surprise, for example, is elicited 
by a combination of appraisals that score highly in pleasantness and novelty; low 
in certainty, agency, and personal responsibility; and medium in attentional 
activity and anticipated effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Each appraisal pattern 
is also assumed to result in specific motivations and action tendencies, such as 
approach or avoidance. Appraisal theory consequently provides a flexible 
framework to understand the processes of emotion and explains how an identical 
situation can lead to unique emotional responses between individuals. 
 Previous research has proposed that emotional experiences can impact 
perception, decision-making, and risk-taking differentially via specific appraisals. 
Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), for example, explored how the induction of 
incidental emotion (in this case, either anger, guilt, gratitude, or pride) affected a 
person’s rating of an acquaintance’s trustworthiness. Based on traditional valence-
centric models, the authors hypothesized that inducing negative incidental 
emotion would reduce a participant’s perception of an acquaintance’s 
trustworthiness whereas positive incidental emotion would increase it. Findings 
only partially supported this hypothesis, as gratitude led to the highest level of 
perceived trustworthiness and anger produced the lowest level, but there was no 
significant difference between guilt and pride. When results were reinterpreted 
through the appraisal theory framework, however, it revealed a relationship 
between an emotion’s non-valence dimensions and the magnitude of the 
emotion’s effect on perceived trustworthiness. Although valence was important 
for predicting the general direction of the effect (positive vs. negative), 
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participants’ judgments were impacted to a greater degree when induced with an 
emotion characterized by an appraisal of other-control (e.g., gratitude and anger) 
versus personal control (e.g., pride and guilt). Pride and guilt only slightly 
impacted perceptions of trustworthiness, whereas anger and gratitude 
demonstrated much more dramatic effects.   
Within risk-taking literature specifically, research is moving beyond 
predicting differences between groups of negative and positive emotions and is 
instead focusing on discriminating successfully between the effects of emotions 
that possess the same valence. In an investigation of incidental fear and anger, 
Lerner et al. (2015) observed that the differences in specific dimensions between 
these two negative emotions are manifested through unique “depths of processing, 
brain hemispheric activation, facial expressions, autonomic responses, and central 
nervous system activity” (p. 804). It is therefore simplistic to assume fear and 
anger will have the same cognitive effects simply because they share a high 
negative valence.  More notably, fear and anger differ in their associated degree 
of certainty and personal control, which relates significantly with risk perception. 
Whereas fear is rooted in the appraisal of the environment as highly unpredictable 
and uncontrollable, anger involves the opposite response and perceives something 
or someone outside the self as the causal agent for the emotion-inducing event 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lu et al., 2013).  Anger, but not fear, has consistently 
been found to reduce the perception of risk, a phenomenon believed to be 
influenced primarily by these dimensions of certainty and individual control (Lu 
et al., 2013). 
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 In a series of three studies, Lu et al. (2013) expanded this research 
question by empirically isolating the effects of specific appraisals on perceived 
driving risk. First, participants read a vignette about driving that was designed to 
elicit either fear or anger. They were then given an additional paragraph with 
details that prompted them to reappraise the scenario with either strengthened or 
inhibited perceptions of their own certainty, control, or responsibility. Since fear 
is associated with low levels of certainty and anger with high levels of certainty, 
participants in the fear condition read details intended to heighten their sense of 
certainty and participants in the anger condition read details that reduced 
certainty. Participants were then asked to rate their level of driving risk perception 
immediately afterwards. The authors hypothesized that if appraisals were key to 
understanding an emotion’s effect on risk perception, then by manipulating 
appraisals alone, the differences between emotion conditions would be reduced. 
Results strongly supported this hypothesis and, in fact, successfully eliminated 
differences in risk perception between fear and anger by altering only their 
associated appraisals in certainty, control, and responsibility. Although Lu et al.’s 
(2013) research did not attempt to apply these findings beyond risk perception to 
risk-taking behavior, initial results by other researchers support the importance of 
appraisals in facilitating these decision-making processes. Studies have found, for 
example, that anger leads participants to make riskier choices in economic games, 
a phenomenon attributed to the impact of high certainty and control appraisals 
(Beisswingert, Zhang, Goetz, Fang, & Fischbacher, 2015).  
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The Importance of Control 
Need for perception of control. Individual control is an important 
appraisal dimension within emotion literature, but it has also been extensively 
investigated within literature related to the self.  Many researchers have argued 
that a perception of control over the self and the environment is a universal human 
need (Bandura, 1977) and is particularly significant because it critically 
influences a person’s motivation to pursue and achieve meaningful goals 
(Ferguson & Goodwin, 2010). Ferguson and Goodwin (2010) found that 
perceptions of high control were correlated with subjective well-being and 
meaning in life, particularly in aging populations. The strength of a person’s need 
for control is influenced by a variety of individual and contextual variables, and 
the predisposition to view oneself as a causal agent can be impacted by factors 
such as age, mindset, levels of self-esteem, attributional style, locus of control, 
affective experience, and the desirability of control in a given situation (Ferguson 
& Goodwin, 2010; Novović, Kovač, Durić, & Biro, 2012). Novović et al. (2012), 
for example, found that positive affect in healthy subjects was related to higher 
perceptions of control, whereas clinical depression was associated with inhibited 
perceptions of control. Similarly, individuals who possess social power 
demonstrate estimations of personal control that extend beyond realistic 
boundaries (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). 
Interestingly, motivation also significantly influences a person’s 
perception of control. Biner and Hua (1995) conducted a clever investigation that 
demonstrated that people’s confidence in their ability to control a game of chance 
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increased when their need for the game’s rewards were higher. When offered a 
food reward, hungry participants were more likely to overestimate their individual 
control over a chance-based game of cards than satiated participants. A similar 
relationship was found when individuals were motivated to avoid an adverse 
consequence of losing (e.g., speaking in front of a large audience or having a hand 
submerged in icy water). Remarkably, even when adverse consequences were 
present, participants in one study willingly reduced their statistical probability of 
winning a game of roulette for the right to exercise the mere illusion of control 
(e.g., pulling a lever versus allowing a random selection of the lottery) (Friedland, 
Keinan, & Regev, 1992). More recent research has identified the consistent 
mediating role of skill perception in the relationship between need and estimates 
of personal control. Participants who are highly motivated to win erroneously 
attribute more skill to chance-based games than exists (Biner, Johnston, Summers, 
& Chudzynski, 2009). These studies indicate that control is intricately linked to 
both internal states and the environmental context, which in certain cases may 
even contribute to perceptions of control that extend beyond realistic boundaries.  
  Illusory control. Despite the importance of personal control within daily 
life, most people do not accurately estimate their level of control over the 
environment (Gino, Sharek, & Moore, 2011). Although newer lines of exploration 
have revealed a phenomenon where people underestimate their control during 
situations of high-controllability (e.g., stopping a moving vehicle by pressing the 
brake; Gino et al., 2011), more commonly studies have supported the human 
tendency to overestimate personal control when actual control is low. An 
10 
 
 
unfounded perception of control is referred to as illusory control, which Langer 
defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher 
than the objective probability would warrant” (1975, p. 313). Although illusory 
control is closely related to other ego-centric biases such as overconfidence and 
unrealistic optimism, it remains conceptually distinct. Whereas unrealistic 
optimism reflects more generalized beliefs about the likelihood of positive 
outcomes, illusory control reflects people’s own certainty that they are the source 
of a specific outcome (Fellner, 2004; McKenna, 1993) According to Langer 
(1975), illusory control is fostered in environments with characteristics that are 
also commonly found in skill-related scenarios (e.g., active involvement, personal 
choice, task familiarity, stimulus familiarity, competition), which facilitate the 
misattribution of outcomes to personal control. 
Psychologists frequently consider illusory control to be an adaptive 
mechanism as it serves to reduce stress and uncertainty and can motivate 
constructive behaviors in the face of challenging circumstances. Control can be 
either primary (external control over a specific situation or outcome) or secondary 
(internal control over one’s response to a situation) (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). 
Through a qualitative study of women diagnosed with breast cancer, Taylor 
(1983) concluded that believing one had some level of control (whether primary 
or secondary) over an uncontrollable situation such as a cancer diagnosis served 
as an important meaning-making mechanism. The belief that one could influence 
future outcomes (i.e., cancer recurrence) by changing one’s behavior facilitated 
subjective well-being even if the belief was not valid. Remarkably, the women’s 
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sense of control over the environment proved to be highly resilient to 
contradiction—if their illusory control was shattered in one domain (e.g., “I 
cannot control whether the cancer comes back”), they simply switched their target 
of control to a separate, often secondary, area of control (e.g., “I can control how I 
respond to the cancer treatments”). These results suggest that cognitive illusions 
play a critical role in supporting psychological functioning, especially within 
situations that threaten the self.  
  Perception of control and risk. Evidence also indicates that the 
perception of control may be particularly instrumental in risky decision-making 
processes. In general, perceptions of control contribute to one’s ability to maintain 
a positive self-presentation to others and high personal self-esteem—a quality 
especially relevant to decisions that involve consequences. For example, 
compulsive gamblers who regularly engage in high-stakes games of chance may 
be more highly motivated to preserve strong illusory control over gambling 
outcomes as a self-protective mechanism (Cowley, Briley, & Farrell, 2015). 
Although illusory control may encourage gamblers to sustain damaging habits 
that can be devastating over time, in the short term this strategy protects the ego 
by affirming the self and justifying the person’s behavioral choices. As illusory 
control can facilitate self-justification within any decision-making scenario that 
involves risk, it remains an important mechanism to consider when investigating 
the factors that lead people to make risky choices. 
Control over risk can be conceptually broken down into two categories: 
perception of control over exposure to the risk and perception of control over 
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outcomes (Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007). Gambling literature 
strongly confirms a positive relationship between the latter aspect of control and 
risk-taking within game settings. Dixon (2000) found that participants gambled 
with more chips in a game of roulette when they could control the chip placement 
rather than when someone else placed the chips. More interestingly, illusory 
control was reinforced by the participants’ selective memory recall; participants 
regularly overestimated the number of wins received when they selected the chip 
placement versus the experimenter placement. Martinez, Le Floch, Gaffié, and 
Villejoubert (2011) also demonstrated that perceiving high levels of personal 
control during the chance-driven game of French roulette significantly predicted 
higher bets and a faster response time in placing bets.  
Researchers such as Rockloff and Dyer (2007) have also confirmed a 
positive relationship between the knowledge that another person has previously 
won at a gambling game and riskier betting behavior; Martinez et al. (2011) more 
recently demonstrated that illusory perceptions of control over the outcome 
mediated this relationship. When no detailed information was given, participants 
consistently misinterpreted the previous player’s success as indicative of skill, but 
when the success was framed as an outcome due to chance, the mere knowledge 
of success did not inflate perceptions of control or risk-taking behavior. Even 
overhearing another player’s misattribution of skill at a video lottery (e.g., “I have 
a feeling you’re due now!”) versus an accurate declaration (e.g., “It is chance that 
determines the results!”) led gamblers to take more risks (Caron & Ladouceur, 
2003, p. 191). Overall, the literature suggests that people tend to form overly 
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liberal rather than overly conservative estimates of the importance of skill in 
predicting gambling outcomes. As a result, gamblers sustain an unrealistic sense 
of control over their chance of winning and may make increasingly risky 
decisions. 
  Interestingly, misattributing the cause and effects of personal control is not 
a phenomenon limited to the domain of gambling. Langens (2007) discovered that 
when individuals receive ambiguous feedback on their performance after failing 
at an unsolvable word problem, those exhibiting high illusory control displayed 
more positivity and more persistence than those who scored low in illusory 
control. Rather than attributing the failure to the self, ambiguous feedback 
allowed individuals to reinterpret the failure as a result of external conditions. The 
author’s conclusion—that illusory control can shield the ego and serve as an 
effective emotional buffer—holds interesting implications for risky decision 
making in both gambling scenarios and elsewhere. For the average person, failure 
feedback may serve as a helpful warning sign to conserve resources and protect 
themselves from incurring greater loss; however, those with high perceptions of 
control who can also reinterpret their failure experience may ultimately choose to 
make riskier choices. 
  As demonstrated by the findings on gambling and failure feedback, 
illusory control can often be disadvantageous. Furthermore, an investigation of 
the role of illusory control within business settings found that it led to lower 
quality decision making by restricting the number of options entrepreneurs chose 
to explore (Carr & Blettner, 2010). The relationship between illusory control and 
14 
 
 
low-quality decision making was strongest when the individuals were highly 
experienced and under high levels of stress; the combination of these factors 
enhanced their cognitive bias by encouraging decision-makers to neglect possible 
adverse outcomes and to rely excessively on previous successes. Other research 
within the same domain reinforced these findings and showed that inexperienced 
entrepreneurs with high illusory control also self-selected riskier investment 
portfolios because they failed to diversity across a wider range of options (Fellner, 
2004). Even among the general population, illusory control can directly result in 
greater risk-taking behavior, as demonstrated by people’s willingness to endorse 
more dangerous driving speeds when they are the driver rather than the passenger 
(Horswill & McKenna, 1999). Together, these studies indicate that strong 
perceptions of control may inevitably expose people to greater potential losses 
both physically and financially. Consequently, the direct and indirect effects of 
illusory control should be considered an important variable in decision-making 
research. 
The Case Study of Guilt 
Researchers Kouchaki, Oveis, and Gino (2014) designed a series of 
studies to test the relationship between incidental emotional experiences, 
perceived sense of control, and the inclination to make risky judgments. The 
studies focused on guilt, a negative emotion characterized by strong levels of 
personal control. While not typically conceptualized along this appraisal 
dimension, guilt is fundamentally rooted in a sense of individual control over the 
environment—an experience of guilt would fail to be induced if a person did not 
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believe that their behavior had directly resulted in a negative outcome for which 
he or she was personally responsible. Kouchaki et al. (2014) found that when 
participants were primed with guilt versus a neutral control condition, they 
estimated that they would experience significantly fewer negative life events and 
more positive events. They also preferred riskier choices when asked to choose 
between either a small but guaranteed amount of money or the chance to win a 
large amount of money. In subsequent studies, Kouchaki et al. (2014) empirically 
demonstrated that priming guilt increased participants’ perceptions of illusory 
control over difficult-to-control situations; additionally, negative affect was 
eliminated as a possible mediator between guilt and risk taking. By utilizing a 
variety of manipulations to prime guilt and assess risk preferences, Kouchaki et 
al. (2014) successfully demonstrated that the appraisal of control mediated the 
relationship between guilt and risk-taking and confirmed that the observed effects 
were robust. 
Rationale  
 The current study built upon the research conducted by Kouchaki et al. 
(2014) on the relationship between emotions characterized by strong appraisals of 
control and an increased preference for risky decisions. Previous studies found 
that other negative emotions high in individual control, such as anger, can also 
lead to an increase in risk taking. No current research, however, has explored 
whether positive-valence emotions characterized by strong control appraisals 
would demonstrate a similar relationship. The emotion of pride provided an 
excellent point for comparison with guilt as it is characterized by very similar 
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appraisals. Pride is defined as “a positive, self-conscious emotion arising from 
achievements that can be attributed to one’s abilities or efforts” (Williams & 
DeSteno, 2008, p. 1007). More broadly, self-conscious emotions such as pride 
and guilt are generated when individuals judge an event to be 1) relevant to their 
goal, 2) either congruent or incongruent with their goal, and 3) attributable to their 
internal self rather than the external environment (Hofman & Fisher, 2012). 
Because the event is attributable to the internal self, individuals feeling pride or 
guilt experience a high degree of personal responsibility (Lerner et al., 2015). 
Using the appraisal dimension framework, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) 
categorized both pride and guilt as social emotions involving relatively high 
levels of certainty and personal control. The two emotions vary primarily along 
the dimension of pleasantness, although pride also reflects less anticipated mental 
and physical effort than guilt.  
The connection between pride and its related dimension of control has 
been measured both directly by appraisal theorists such as Ellsworth and Smith 
(1988) and indirectly by other researchers. Williams and DeSteno (2008), for 
example, demonstrated that authentic pride (i.e., pride that originates in a specific 
event or success) motivated greater perseverance on a challenging experimental 
task. This finding can be considered antithetical to examples of learned 
helplessness where subjects cease their attempts to control the environment; in 
contrast to control subjects, prideful subjects continued interacting with their 
environment to achieve a goal. Hypothetically, these subjects’ previous 
experience (which led to feelings of pride) motivated them to persist because it 
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was a readily available example of their ability to successfully impact external 
outcomes. 
The current study sought to continue the empirical investigation of the 
relationship between incidental emotion, appraisals, and decision-making. First, 
we intended to replicate previous findings on the effects of guilt on risky 
decision-making and second, we investigated the effects of pride within the same 
paradigm. The present study also expanded the experimental design to include 
additional measures of illusory control and risk-taking not included in the original 
research, to provide further evidence of the robust nature of the relationship 
between control appraisals and risk taking.  Results of this study will help 
illuminate the extent to which valence and control appraisals contribute to 
decision-making in the context of risky choices. Although early emotion research 
presented valence-centric models as the best framework for understanding 
emotional influence on behavior, appraisal theorists contended that researchers 
have traditionally underestimated the complex influence of other factors (e.g., the 
situation’s level of novelty, anticipated effort, attentional activity, certainty, and 
personal control). Through the systematic investigation of individual appraisals, 
we can better understand how each component informs the decision-making 
process and more accurately predict the combination of factors that enhances a 
person’s inclination to take risks. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Given the earlier findings by Kouchaki et al. (2014) and Ellsworth and 
Smith’s (1988) identification of appraisal dimensions, we hypothesized that 
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incidental emotions characterized by high levels of personal control would lead to 
greater risky decision-making when compared to both a neutral emotion condition 
(the control group) and a low-control emotion (i.e., sadness). These two 
conditions served as control groups.  
 
Hypothesis I: In comparison to both the control group and the sadness 
condition, individuals experiencing guilt will demonstrate (Ia) greater 
perceptions of control and (Ib) higher risk-taking.  
 
Hypothesis II: In comparison to both the control group and the sadness 
condition, individuals experiencing pride will demonstrate (IIa) greater 
perceptions of control and (IIb) higher risk-taking. 
 
Hypothesis III: Greater perceptions of control will mediate the relationship 
between guilt and higher risk-taking. 
 
Hypothesis IV: Greater perceptions of control will mediate the relationship 
between pride and higher risk-taking. 
 
Hypothesis V: There will be no significant difference in risk-taking 
between pride and guilt conditions. 
 
19 
 
 
Within Kouchaki et al.s’ (2014) original experimental paradigm, risk- 
taking was assessed by asking participants to choose between financial options 
that were framed in terms of possible gains (e.g., “Do you want a 50% chance of 
getting $800 OR $100 for sure?”) No questions were framed in terms of loss (e.g., 
“Do you want a 50% of losing your $800 OR lose $100 for sure?”). Yet people do 
not perceive a scenario phrased in terms of loss the same way they perceive an 
identical situation phrased in terms of gain. Research has consistently supported 
the presence of a “framing effect” where people exhibit a strong desire to avoid 
any sure loss, regardless of its size. As a result, they are much more likely to 
gamble (risking greater potential loss) for the chance to keep everything (Lewis, 
2016). Other research further suggested that affect can influence risk-seeking and 
risk-aversion differentially depending on whether the risky choice was framed in 
terms of loss or gain (Cheung & Mikels, 2011); therefore, the current research 
included both gain-frames and loss-frames in its measure of risk. However, it was 
unknown what effects framing might have on decision-making in this context. 
 
Research Question: How will guilt, pride, and sadness affect an individual’s risky 
decision making in trials where choices are framed in terms of loss versus gain? 
 
Method 
Research Participants 
 Participants included 152 undergraduate students at a large, public 
Midwestern university. Participants were recruited from introductory psychology 
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courses through the university’s participant pool and received 1 hour of academic 
credit as compensation for participation. Slightly under half of the sample (46%) 
were first year students, with a mean age of approximately 20 years. Participants 
were 68% female. Participants were roughly 53% Caucasian, 21% Latinx, 14% 
Black, 8% Asian, 2% Pacific Islander/American Indian. Three participants were 
removed due to non-compliance with the risk task instructions, for a total sample 
size of 149 participants. 
Procedure 
  The current study compared four conditions: guilt induction, pride 
induction, sadness induction, and a neutral emotion condition. Upon arriving at 
the research computer lab, participants were randomly assigned through Qualtrics 
to one of the four conditions upon arriving at the research computer lab and were 
told they would engage in a series tasks related to personal beliefs and decision-
making (see Appendix A). First, participants completed the emotion induction 
exercise. They then completed a series of appraisal-related questions reporting 
their perception of the emotional event they described during the exercise. They 
continued by responding to the illusory control items and completing a number 
guessing game designed to assess perceptions of personal control. Lastly, they 
participated in a risk-taking gambling task and responded to basic demographic 
questions. To ensure that participants remained engaged throughout the game 
tasks, they were told they would have the opportunity to enter a drawing for a 
Starbucks gift card based on their performance in the games. 
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Materials 
 Emotion induction. To induce the emotions of pride, guilt, and sadness, 
participants were asked to recall a time when they experienced their assigned 
emotion and compose a written response to the prompt (see Appendix B). For 
example, the pride induction was as follows:  
 “Please describe a time in your personal life where you behaved in a way   
that made you feel pride. Please describe the details about this situation 
that made you feel pride. What was it like to be in this situation? What 
thoughts and feelings did you experience? Describe the situation and any 
thoughts or feelings you experienced. Please proving as many details as 
possible so that a person reading your entry would understand the situation 
and how you felt.” 
The guilt and sadness inductions used identical narrative structures with the 
appropriate emotion words replaced. In the control condition, participants were 
asked simply to describe a typical day. To ensure that the intensity of the 
emotional events were balanced across conditions, participants were then asked to 
report on a 7-point scale the extent to which they had experienced sadness, guilt, 
and pride in the event they wrote about (see Appendix C). Participants also 
indicated through Likert-scale questions the extent to which they felt that 1) the 
event was pleasant, 2) they were personally responsible for causing the situation 
that happened, 3) someone other than themselves had caused the situation to 
happen, 4) chance or circumstance caused the situation to happen, 5) they could 
control what was happening, and 6) the situation required them to exert mental or 
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physical effort. Responses were used to assess whether the emotion induction task 
had induced the expected appraisal patterns for each emotion condition.  
Illusory control measures. 
  Illusory control scale. The following series of questions were used 
previously in similar studies as a measure of illusory control (Kouchaki et al., 
2014; Fast et al., 2009). Participants were asked to indicate their level of 
perceived control over five items that were generally considered beyond the 
control of any single individual (see Appendix D). Responses were rated on a 
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”). Sample items included, “To what 
extent will our country look different in the future because of you?”, “To what 
extent are you able to have some control over the economy?”, and “To what 
extent can you influence politicians?” A new survey item on environmental 
practice (“To what extent are you able to influence the environment by engaging 
in sustainable practices?”) replaced a previous question on an individual’s ability 
to influence presidential elections. The revised scale demonstrated strong 
reliability (α = .803). 
  Number guessing game. Next, participants received instructions on how 
to play a short gambling game which served as a second measure of illusory 
control (see Appendix E). Participants were told that the computer would 
randomly select a number between 1 and 100 and they would have five 
opportunities to choose the selected number. Prior to beginning, they were asked 
to rate on a scale, "How confident are you that you will win the number guessing 
game?" (1 = “not at all”; 7 = “very much”). Higher values on this question 
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indicated higher perceptions of personal control. Participants then typed their five 
guesses into the computer textbox but were not be told whether they correctly 
guessed the number until the end of the experiment. 
Framed Gambling Task. Risk-taking (see Appendix F and G) was 
assessed using the manipulation designed by De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, 
and Dolan (2006). The gambling task consisted of 32 computerized trials. On 
each trial, participants were given a sum of money (either $25, $50, $75, or $100) 
and were asked to choose either a guaranteed option (lose or keep certain amount 
for sure) or a risky option (gamble on set probability of retaining the original full 
amount). For example, if the participant was given $25, they might be asked 
whether they would prefer to keep $15 and lose $10 (the sure option) or gamble 
with an 80% chance of keeping all $25. The probability of the gamble alternated 
between 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80%. In addition, trials alternated between questions 
where the choice was framed as a gain (e.g., “keep $15”) versus a loss (e.g., “lose 
$10”). Throughout the trials, the expected value of the outcomes for each choice 
remained identical.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To evaluate whether the emotion induction exercise successfully resulted 
in difference emotional experiences, participants’ self-reported levels of guilt, 
pride, and sadness were analyzed (see Tables 5-7 for post-hoc results). Results of 
a MANOVA, F(3, 145) = 54.05, p < .001, Wilk's Λ = .119, followed by a Tukey 
post-hoc analysis, indicated that participants reported the greatest level of pride 
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(M = 6.37, SD = 1.32) in the pride condition, F(3, 145) = 116.014, p < .001, η2 = 
.508. Participants experienced the greatest guilt in the guilt condition (M = 6.34, 
SD = .94), although the sadness condition reported the second highest level of 
guilt (M = 4.31, SD = 2.04), F(3, 145) = 78.48, p < .001, η2= .619. Participants 
reported the greatest degree of sadness in the sadness condition (M = 6.36, SD = 
0.93), although the guilt condition also indicated high levels of sadness (M = 5.29, 
SD = 1.47), F(3, 145) = 86.32, p < .001, η2 = .641. There was no difference, 
however, between conditions in the reported intensity of the target emotion (i.e., 
guilt in the guilt condition, pride in the pride condition, and sadness in the sadness 
condition), F(2, 109) = .005, p = .995. These results indicated that the emotion 
induction task was successful, and the three conditions were comparable in 
emotional intensity.  
 Because the appraisal of personal control was predicted to be a variable 
integral to the current research question, it was important that the groups selected 
for comparison (i.e., sadness and the neutral condition) differed from guilt and 
pride. As a manipulation check, a one-way ANOVA, F(3, 145) = 8.56, p < .001, 
η2=.150, compared the pride, guilt, sadness, and neutral conditions on the 
question, “In the event you described, to what extent did you feel you could 
control what was happening?” Concurrent with theory-based predictions, people 
recalling events related to pride and guilt did not differ in their reported level of 
personal control over the emotion-inducing event (Mpride = 4.74, SDpride = 1.96 vs. 
Mguilt = 5.09, SDguilt = 1.99), but both conditions reported much higher levels of 
perceived control than the sadness condition (M = 3.44, SD = 2.11). 
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Unexpectedly, participants in the control condition also reported high levels of 
personal control (M = 5.54, SD =1.52) that were not significantly different than 
the guilt and pride conditions, indicating that the neutral emotion condition in this 
specific study was an inappropriate choice for comparison as it was not neutral in 
terms of personal control appraisals. Participants in the neutral condition were 
subsequently removed from the data set for the next analyses, reducing the sample 
size to 112 subjects.  
Appraisal Patterns 
 The three emotion conditions (pride, guilt, and sadness) were compared on 
the following six appraisal dimensions: pleasantness, agency of self, agency of 
others, agency of circumstances or chance, personal control, and anticipated 
mental or physical effort. All appraisals were rated on a 7-point scale. Results of a 
MANOVA, F(2, 109) = 18.70, p < .001, Wilk's Λ = .231, η2 = .519, and 
subsequent Tukey post-hoc tests (see Tables 8-13) indicated the following: 
 Pride events (M = 5.76, SD = 1.53) were rated as significantly more 
pleasant than sadness (M = 1.64, SD = 1.35) or guilt events (M = 1.97, SD = 1.25), 
F(2, 109) = 103.59, p < .001, η2 = .655. Both pride (M = 5.34, SD = 1.99) and 
guilt (M = 6.14, SD = 1.38) events were ascribed relatively high levels of self-
agency, but only guilt was found to be significantly higher than sadness events (M 
= 4.54, SD = 2.10), F(2, 109) = 6.844, p < .01, η2 = .112.. Pride events (M = 4.42, 
SD = 2.06) were also reported to have significantly higher attributions of others-
agency than guilt (M = 2.66, SD = 1.47), though the difference between the pride 
and sadness condition (M = 3.59, SD = 2.12) did not reach statistical significance 
26 
 
 
(p = .116), F(2, 109) = 7.68, p < .01, η2 =.123.  There were no significant 
differences (p = .087) in perceived agency of chance between pride (M = 3.05, SD 
= 1.82), guilt (M = 3.83, SD = 2.11), or sadness (M = 4.15, SD = 2.28), F(2, 109) 
= 2.84, p > .05, η2 =.05. Pride events were perceived as requiring significantly 
greater levels of anticipated effort (M = 5.95, SD = 1.59, p < .05) than the guilt (M 
= 4.91, SD = 1.84) or sadness conditions (M = 4.90, SD = 2.01), F(2, 109) = 4.10, 
p < .05, η2 =.07.  
Control and Risk-Taking 
 To test Hypothesis Ia and IIa, a one-way ANOVA evaluated whether there 
were any differences in illusory control (using the mean of the five Likert-scale 
questions) between emotion conditions (see Table 14 for means). No significant 
difference was found, F(2, 109) = .080, p = .923. A second ANOVA was run to 
determine whether participants differed in their level of confidence in being able 
to correctly guess a computer-generated number (the second measure of illusory 
control), but no differences were found based on emotion condition F(2, 109) = 
.546, p = .581. Overall, means were very low for this measure, between 2.74 and 
3.09 on a 7-point scale. 
 To test Hypothesis Ib and IIb, risk-taking behavior in the gambling task 
was assessed, using the total percentage of the gambles selected (out of 32 total 
trials) as the dependent variable (see Table 15). A one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant differences in gambling between the pride (M = .56, SD = .15), guilt 
(M = .59, SD =.17), and sadness conditions (M = .53, SD = .17), F(2, 109) = 1.11, 
p = .333). As Hypothesis I and II were not supported, analyses were not run to test 
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Hypothesis III and IV. Hypothesis V, which predicted no differences between the 
pride and guilt conditions in terms of perceived control and risk-taking, was 
supported by the results. 
As an additional exploratory research question, group gambling 
differences based on framing effects were tested. There was a strong framing 
effect overall, with people gambling significantly more in the loss frames (M = 
.65, SD = .19) than the gain frames (M = .48, SD = .19), F(1, 111) = 83.89, p < 
.001. However, there was no significant interaction between framing and emotion 
conditions, F(2, 109) = .870, p = .422. 
Discussion 
Incidental emotions often serve as powerful facilitators or inhibitors for 
risky decision-making, although the specific factors underlying these cognitive 
processes are still debated. The appraisal theory of emotion, which describes 
emotions as responses to specific environmental information, provides a flexible 
framework to explore the nuanced effects of emotion on risk-taking. By 
considering multiple dimensions of the emotional experience, such as 
pleasantness, agency, level of certainty, attentional activity, anticipated effort, 
novelty, and personal control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Moors et al., 2013), 
researchers have successfully identified relationships between specific appraisals 
and risk-taking. Appraising the environment as being highly certain and within 
one’s control, for example—which occurs when people experience the emotion of 
anger but not fear—leads people to take more risks (Lu et al., 2013). 
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The current research builds upon these previous findings to further explore 
the relationship between appraisals of personal control and risk-taking.  Utilizing 
a paradigm very similar to the Kouchaki et al. (2014) study, this study 
investigated whether incidental experiences of pride and guilt (emotions 
characterized by strong appraisals of personal control) would lead to greater risky 
decision-making. Although it was hypothesized that people experiencing guilt and 
pride would take more risks that people who experienced sadness (an emotion 
characterized by low appraisals of personal control) or a neutral emotion 
condition, there were no differences in risk-taking based on emotion condition. 
This finding held true across both gain- and loss-framed gambling trials, 
indicating that the emotion condition did not interact with framing to make 
gambling more likely under certain combinations of conditions. Though the 
pattern of means did consistently fall in the predicted direction, with guilt leading 
to the highest percentage of gambling and sadness the lowest, these differences 
were marginal and non-significant. Furthermore, the neutral emotion condition 
was removed from analysis as it was found that the typical “neutral” writing 
prompt used in emotion induction manipulations did not generate an experience 
that was neutral in terms of control appraisals. The study failed to replicate the 
Kouchaki et al. (2014) findings on guilt and did not provide evidence to 
substantiate the role of perceived personal control on risk-taking.  
Expanding the findings of this study beyond risk-taking, the responses to 
the appraisal-related questions within each emotion condition contribute to our 
understanding of the appraisal patterns specific to guilt, pride, and sadness 
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experiences. As Smith and Ellsworth (1985) also found in their initial 
investigation, this study confirmed that guilt was characterized by low appraisals 
of pleasantness, high appraisals of self-agency, and medium-high levels of 
personal control and anticipated effort. Sadness, in contrast, involved low 
appraisals of pleasantness, low levels of anticipated effort, moderate levels of 
chance-based agency, and moderate levels of others-agency; although it was 
expected that sadness would score lower on self-agency than was the case. Pride 
was characterized by a high degree of pleasantness, self-agency, and personal 
control but also, surprisingly, was described as having high levels of anticipated 
effort and others-agency. As predicted, pride and guilt held very similar appraisal 
patterns across most dimensions; however, it was unanticipated that the two 
would differ in agency appraisals. Despite perceiving the self as having high 
levels of personal agency and control in the situations they recalled, people in the 
pride condition simultaneously perceived other people as having a high level of 
responsibility over pride-inducing events. These findings contribute to appraisal-
related literature by providing new evidence that other people may play a more 
significant role in pride experiences than previously assumed.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The current investigation of emotion and risk-taking was limited in its use 
of an emotion induction technique that could not control for variations in 
individual experience. Because participants could choose which emotional event 
in their lives to write about, the experiences they recalled varied in terms of 
recency, intensity, attributions, and emotional purity. Participants within the guilt 
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and sadness conditions, for example, often recalled an event that induced 
simultaneous feelings of guilt and sadness, creating a mixed emotional experience 
that may have led to different effects than a purer experience of guilt or sadness. 
Similarly, despite being specifically instructed to recall instances in which they 
had performed an action that led them to feel pride (e.g., studying hard and 
getting an A on a test), some participants reported an event where they played no 
personal role and the pride-inducing action was performed by someone else (e.g., 
the Cubs winning the World Series in 2016).  
Though the autobiographical memory recall task is one of the most 
popularly used emotion induction techniques, qualitative text analyses of the 
content generated by participants are much less frequently used. While analyses 
of this type are often time-consuming and challenging to conduct, they may reveal 
important information (such as variation in the type of content generated) that 
cannot be as effectively captured through self-reports.  Alternatively, using a 
different emotional induction method, for example a rigged team-player game 
where participants are led to believe that either they were primarily responsible 
for the team loss (i.e., guilt) or team win (i.e., pride), could better standardize the 
emotions induced and ensure consistency across participant experiences. 
This study also differed from the original Kouchaki et al. (2014) study in 
that it used a unique risk-taking task. The structure of the task was similar in that 
it required participants to choose between a sure financial choice or a riskier, 
uncertain financial choice, yet the gambling task used here was longer (32 trials 
versus four trials) and more complex (incorporating both gain-framed and loss-
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framed trials). One concern in using a longer task is that it was unknown how 
long the incidental emotion induced by the recall task would last. It is possible 
that the carryover effects of the emotion induction faded more quickly than 
anticipated, and therefore perhaps only the first trials of the task were influenced 
by lingering emotion.   
Future research should address these limitations by evaluating the 
relationship between emotion and risk-taking using a wider variety of emotion-
induction techniques and risk-taking assessments. Differences in sampling 
populations should also be considered as there may have been unknown, inherent 
differences between the university sample used in this study and those tested in 
earlier research. Expanding beyond a university sample would be beneficial in 
testing the strength of the relationship previously found and determining the 
generalizability of the results.  
Future investigations should also empirically explore the anecdotal 
differences observed in this study between pride experiences characterized by 
actions performed by the self versus actions performed by other people. The 
extent to which it is important to distinguish between these two types of pride 
experiences is unknown, as are their potential differential effects on general 
decision-making. Results from the current study suggest that there may be more 
diversity in the types of pride experiences participants recall, and that other 
people may be perceived as more agentic in pride experiences than earlier 
research suggests (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
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In summary, the influence of incidental emotion on risky decision-making 
in everyday life remains an important research question. Understanding the 
mechanisms through which specific affective experiences can intensify or inhibit 
risk-taking can benefit our ability to anticipate people’s decision-making and help 
them avoid extreme consequences by making more informed choices.  The 
current research confirms that emotional experiences are characterized by specific 
environmental appraisal patterns, although the specific effect of control appraisals 
on risk-taking remains inconclusive.  Future research should consider the 
limitations discussed above and continue to evaluate the extent to which 
perceptions of control lead to greater risk-taking, as well as consider the 
conditions under which this relationship may not be found.  
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Appendix A 
Sona Recruitment Ad 
In this research study, you will be asked to respond to a short autobiographical 
prompt and answer some general questions about your life and personal beliefs. 
You will then play a short decision-making game. You will also be asked to 
provide basic demographic information (e.g., gender, race, age). The study will 
take approximately 30 minutes, to be completed in lab 990 W. Fullerton, room 
109. You will earn 1 psychology pool credit for your participation. 
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Appendix B 
Emotion Induction Writing Prompt 
Pride/Guilt/Sadness Conditions  
Please describe a time in your personal life where you behaved in a way 
that made you feel [insert emotion]. Please describe the details about this 
situation that made you feel [insert emotion]. What was it like to be in 
this situation? What thoughts and feelings did you experience? Describe 
the situation and any thoughts or feelings you experienced. Please provide 
as many details as possible so that a person reading your entry would 
understand the situation and how you felt. 
Please note: This question should take about 5 minutes of your time. 
Neutral Condition 
Please describe a typical day in your life. Provide as many details as 
possible so that a person reading your entry would be able to clearly 
picture your day. Try to make your report of your activities as factual and 
objective as possible, and make sure to describe the what, where, and 
when of your daily schedule. 
Please note: This question should take about 5 minutes of your time. 
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Appendix C 
Emotion Appraisal Questions 
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Appendix D 
Illusory Control Measure 
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Appendix E 
Number Guessing Game 
 
(next page) 
 
(next page) 
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Appendix F 
Gambling Task Instructions 
 
(next page) 
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Appendix G 
Sample of Gambling Task Trial 
The amount participants received on the trial (see top slide) varied between $25, 
$50, $75, or $100. The left option (see second slide) always reflects retaining an 
amount that is one-fifth of the amount received, but alternates between being 
phrased in terms of loss (“Lose $20”) versus gain (“Keep $80”). The probability 
of winning the gamble to keep the full amount of what was received (see right 
option) varied between 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%. 
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Appendix H 
Demographics 
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Table 1 
Demographics 
Demographic Variable n Percentage M SD 
Age   19.81 3.28 
     
Gender     
     Female 103 69%   
     Male 45 30%   
     Other 1 1%   
     
Ethnicity     
     White 78 52%   
     Hispanic 33 22%   
     Black 22 15%   
     Asian 13 9%   
     Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 1 1%   
     American Indian/Alaskan Native 2 1%   
     
School Year     
     Freshmen 69 46%   
     Sophomore 38 26%   
     Junior 30 20%   
     Senior 12 8%   
     
Note: Total n = 149     
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Table 2 
Demographics After Removing Neutral Condition 
Demographic Variable n Percentage M SD 
Age   19.85 3.64 
     
Gender     
     Female 78 70%   
     Male 34 30%   
     Other     
     
Ethnicity     
     White 58 52%   
     Hispanic 24 21%   
     Black 18 16%   
     Asian 9 8%   
     Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 1 1%   
     American Indian/Alaskan Native 2 2%   
     
School Year     
     Freshmen 52 46%   
     Sophomore 28 25%   
     Junior 21 19%   
     Senior 11 10%   
     
Note: Total N = 112     
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Table 3 
Intensity of Emotions Within Conditions 
Item Condition M SD 
How much pride did you feel? Pride 6.37 1.32 
 Guilt 1.46 1.12 
 Sadness 1.54 1.07 
 Neutral 4.08 1.72 
    
How much guilt did you feel? Pride 1.82 1.63 
 Guilt 6.34 0.94 
 Sadness 4.31 2.04 
 Neutral 1.65 1.16 
    
How much sadness did you feel? Pride 2.24 1.65 
 Guilt 5.29 1.47 
 Sadness 6.36 0.93 
 Neutral 2.16 1.52 
    
Note: Items scored on a 7-point Likert scale. 
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Table 4 
Means for Emotion Appraisals 
Appraisal Condition M SD 
Pleasantness Pride 5.76 1.53 
 Guilt 1.97 1.25 
 Sadness 1.64 1.35 
    
Agency of Self Pride 5.34 1.99 
 Guilt 6.14 1.38 
 Sadness 4.54 2.10 
    
Agency of Others Pride 4.42 2.06 
 Guilt 2.66 1.47 
 Sadness 3.59 2.12 
    
Agency of Chance Pride 3.05 1.82 
 Guilt 3.83 2.11 
 Sadness 4.15 2.28 
    
Personal Control Pride 5.09 1.99 
 Guilt 4.74 1.96 
 Sadness 3.44 2.11 
    
Anticipated Effort Pride 5.95 1.59 
 Guilt 4.91 1.84 
 Sadness 4.90 2.01 
    
Note: Items scored on a 7-point Likert scale. 
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Table 5 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Pride 
 
Table 6 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Guilt 
 
Table 7 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Sadness 
 
Table 8 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Personal Control 
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Table 9 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Pleasantness 
 
 
Table 10 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Self 
 
Table 11 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Others 
 
Table 12 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Chance 
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Table 13 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Anticipated Effort 
 
 
Table 14 
Means for Illusory Control Measures 
Measure Condition M SD 
Illusory Control Scale Pride 3.68 1.19 
 Guilt 3.61 1.16 
 Sadness 3.57 1.18 
    
Number Guessing Game Pride 2.74 1.54 
 Guilt 3.09 1.74 
 Sadness 3.08 1.68 
    
Note: Total N = 112 
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Table 15 
Gambling Percentages within Emotion Conditions 
Percentage of Gambles Condition M SD 
Total  Pride 56% 15.4% 
 Guilt 59% 17.0% 
 Sadness 53% 16.8% 
    
Under Loss Frame  Pride 64% 17.6% 
 Guilt 69% 20.5% 
 Sadness 61% 19.8% 
    
Under Gain Frame  Pride 49% 19.0% 
 Guilt 49% 17.4% 
 Sadness 46% 19.7% 
Note: Total N = 112    
 
 
 
